

**RHESUS**  
ENGINEERING

# Watch your Software

Why Trustzone™ is great, but it's  
not the end of the story

# About: Rhesus Engineering

- Small engineering bureau located in Zürich, Switzerland
- Strong focus on:
  - Embedded Linux / Android Platform Porting
  - Linux Driver Development
  - Embedded Software / ECos, FreeRTOS, etc.
  - Bare Metal Software
- Background in SOC technologies (Intel, Xilinx, NXP)
- More info: [info@rhesus.ch](mailto:info@rhesus.ch) or <https://rhesus.ch>

# Trustzone! Secure-Boot! Encrypted Bitstream! What could go wrong!

- Trustzone is pretty secure (combined with signed loaders, kernels and binaries)

- Until a simple bug – five layers above – destroys it all




# What can go wrong? Theft, DDOS, Proxies, Crypto-Coins

- IP-Theft
- Bandwidth
- Disguise
- Calculation-Power
- Piracy

# Breaking: Gazillions of IOT-Blenders hacked!!!!

- Not so “fake” headline as you would think at first
  - Refrigerators sending spam
  - People turning on and off lights in random homes
  - Access to CAN bus via GSM network
  - Taking over adult toys via Bluetooth
  - List goes on...



# Example 1: High level fails

- Some large home-router company allowed admin access without a password
- All the browser had to do was to send a special user-agent string
- That backdoor was intentionally placed there
  
- Same company also included their private signing keys in a firmware update binary at some other point in time

# Example 2: The Sony PS3 hack

- Strong Hypervisor for separating stuff and allowing Guest-OSs
- All guest memory accesses managed by the MMU via HTAB Entries
- Someone glitched the Address-Bus.
  
- MMU tricked to not release access to a memory location and hypervisor tricked to place a new HTAB entry into it
- HTAB entry changed by guest OS: full access to physical memory
- Some memory Read/Write primitives installed
  
- In the end: all level0 firmware encryptions keys where recovered (due to weak crypto) and leaked

# Example 3: The Nintendo Switch hack

- Nintendo did good on HW level (full program: encryption, signing, etc.)
  - But: they added a web-rendering engine for registering to WIFI networks (webkit)
  - Attackers spoofed DNS replies and sent an evil “registration page” to exploit webkit.
  - From there the attackers started to explore the system
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- Today there is an exploit on the Tegra X1 **bootrom** level (USB rescue mode to load unsigned binaries)



# Example 4: The Sony PS4 Hack

- Sony uses signing and encryption
- In the beginning there was a web browser
- Over time the attackers:
  - Created a file browser in the web browser
  - Dumped on older version kernel via PCIe (and found symmetrical keys & ELF information)
  - Found out that crash dumps are encrypted with the symmetrical keys
  - Found FreeBSD Kernel vulnerabilities
  - Etc. Etc.
- The PS4 runs Linux now

# Fail 1: Web Browser / Server

- Do not include a web browser into your product unless you absolutely have to!
  - If you have to: get professional help.
  - Javascript is pure evil (sorry... all you full-stack developers)
- Webservers are a target as well
  - XSS – sometimes even on “but we are only reading values” servers

# Fail 2: Standard Passwords

- No development backdoors!
  - They will make it into the release build at some point
  - If interactive access is really needed: Add strong per-device passwords and transport encryption
    - No: the Mac Address is not a good choice for generating the passwords

# Fail 3: You should: Get your crypto right

```
int getRandomNumber()  
{  
    return 4; // chosen by fair dice roll.  
             // guaranteed to be random.  
}
```

- Don't roll your own
  - Crypto is hard
  - If you don't understand it fully: you will do it wrong.



# Conclusions

- Don't under estimate the software layer
  - Don't feel safe just because you have a strong hardware security concept
  - Adding security on hardware level is complex
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- Deploy a defined and clear release process (over all involved departments)



Questions?